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ABSTRACT 
 
We estimate the role of openness and integration in welfare generation in a cross 
country framework. Once controlling for institutions, openness is generally associated 
with increased wage inequalities across nations. However the results for trade policy 
are mixed. Decrease in import taxes increase wage inequality, whereas decrease in 
export taxes has an egalitarian effect. The results are applicable only to the larger 
sample of developed and developing countries. If the sample is restricted to 
developing countries, protection by means of export and import taxes is good for 
unskilled workers as higher trade taxes seem to put a downward pressure on the wage 
gaps between skilled and unskilled.  The results highlight the bottle neck faced by 
both developing and developed countries in WTO talks which have not been 
successful as yet in terms of further decrease in trade taxes. In case this situation 
prevails, the paper calls for more South-South trade which would enable developing 
countries to decrease the relative wage gaps among their labour force.  
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1. Introduction: 
 
To date, most of the countries in our global village have embraced or initiated 
processes of liberalization. The idea is to follow neo-classical paradigm of free 
markets in order to achieve variety of economic as well as social objectives, as free 
markets are assumed to be one of the key catalysts for growth and its determinants. 
This belief in the efficacy of free markets has also been the basic guiding principle of 
contemporary globalization.  
 
Many studies have shown that trade is not only the engine of growth but it also 
sustains it (e.g. Sirnivasan and Bhagwati, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2004). It is also 
believed by the proponents of ‘free markets’ that the countries, developing as well as 
developed ones, who have opened up their economies more, have achieved better 
economic performance. For example, developing countries that opened up in the 
1990s witnessed faster growth than the rich countries and hence are catching up. On 
the other hand it is asserted that the non globalizing part of the developing world is 
falling further and further behind (Dollar and Kraay, 2004). The accession to global 
economy has indeed brought prosperity to different areas in the world (Sen, 2002). In 
contrast with the general perception1, there is also some evidence that world poverty 
and inequality is declining. Sala-i-Martin (2002) in his much publicized paper, has 
shown the fraction of the world's population below the poverty line (defined as an 
income of $2 a day in constant 1985 dollars) has fallen to 18% in 1998 from 44% in 
1970, where as overall inequality (Gini-coefficient)2 has fallen to 0.63 in 1998 from 
0.66 in 19703.  
 
 
Dollar and Kraay (2004) have shown that openness to international trade in particular 
appears to benefit poor people as much as everyone else. The study pointed out the 
experience of countries in the Asia and Pacific region (i.e., the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Taipei, China) which contains a broad range of examples concerning 
both trade liberalization and poverty reduction. The paper also implied that reforms 
on average have had little effect on income distribution. Other recent cross country 
studies also emphasized opening up as necessary policy tool for poverty alleviation. 
For example, many studies attribute high growth rates achieved by China and India to 
their opening up in 80s and 90s, whereas the same period is associated with a decline 
of incidence of poverty from 28% in 1978 to 9% in 1998 in China and from 51% in 
1978 to 27% in 2000 in India respectively (see Srinivasam and Bhagwati 2002). 
 
 
All in all proponents of globalization are confident that free trade carries significant 
pro poor growth effects. However, the increasing concentration of world poverty in 
some regions of the world (e.g. Sub Saharan Africa) and instances of rise in spatial 
inequality4 in developing countries which have opened up (i.e. China, Vietnam, 
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Columbia and Venezuela etc) implies that processes of growth 
needs a careful evaluation and we have to exhaust all possible channels through which 
poverty is affected. For example, trade might very well be good for poor because it is 
good for growth but if trade amplifies inequalities between income groups, it cannot 
claim to be the harbinger of welfare generation because income distribution is no less 
a vital determinant of poverty than growth itself.  
 
Behrman et al (2001) noticed that in 7 out of 18 Latin American countries that 
initiated market reforms in the mid 1980s, inequality has actually increased in recent 
times. The rest of the economies in their sample showed that inequality was 
approximately same in 1990s to the levels of 1980s. Jayasuriya (2002), though 
accepting that liberalization has tended to reduce consumption poverty in South Asia, 
joins the critics5 of Dollar and Kraay’s findings concerning neutral distributional 
effects of liberalization.  
 
It is further noticed in many studies that liberalization process in many developing 
countries seems to be biased against low-skilled labor. The empirical verification in 
this regard comes mainly from Latin American region primarily because most of the 
economies in the region undertook rigorous reform policies in the mid 1980s as part 
of their structural adjustment plans and also witnessed grappling inequality in Post 
reform periods. Ligovini et al (2001) found out that inequality in Mexico rose sharply 
between 1984 and 1994 and rising returns to skill labor accounted for 20 percent of 
the increase in the inequality in household per capita income. Similarly, Hanson and 
Harrison (1999) found that the reduction in tariffs and the elimination in import 
licenses account for 23 percent increase in the relative wages of skilled labor over the 
period of 1986-1990 thus providing further evidence for the role liberalization played 
in rising inequality in Mexico. Other country studies on Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela, also show that skilled workers received increased premiums after 
liberalization when compared to their unskilled counterparts (World Bank, 2001).  
 
Such empirical evidence contradicts the basic trade theory which suggests that trade 
liberalization would result in an increase in demand for low-skilled in a developing 
country, thereby improving the relative earnings of this group compared with the 
more skilled. The evidence further feeds the fears of Ravallion (2003), who coined the 
possibility that openness to trade can lead to the demand for relatively skilled labor, 
which tends to be more inequitably distributed in poor countries than rich ones. He  
also proposed caution regarding the results of David and Dollar (2004) paper 
concerning neutral inequality effects of trade reform on the base of latter’s 
methodology and referred to his own empirical work which found that reform process 
do carry unequal distributional effects. 
 
 
The rationale for expecting an effect of trade on wage inequality is based on the 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) trade model. As Slaughter (2000) puts 
it: “… [free] trade lowers the real wage of the scarce factor and raises that of the 
abundant factor compared to autarky” (p. 131). Assuming that developed countries 
are generally abundant in skilled labor, increasing trade with developing countries, 
which are unskilled labor abundant, should raise the wages of skilled workers relative 
to unskilled in developed countries. Where as, the returns to unskilled labor should 
increase in developing countries with the opening up of trade with developed 
countries.  
 
In the simple H-O-S theorem an explanation for rising inequality after liberalization 
can be that developing countries protect the unskilled intensive of the two goods, and 
not the skill intensive prior to liberalization. So after liberalization the producers of 
unskilled intensive good face increased costs amid more outside competition in the 
absence of government subsidies. Thus an increased downward pressure is exerted to 
the wages of the unskilled labor force employed in the production of that unskilled 
good.   
 
 
However, in the real world there are more than two countries, more than two products 
and sufficiently dissimilar factor endowments across all the countries. A country 
which is unskilled abundant in a global sense can still experience wage inequality 
from opening up if that country is skill abundant in the regional sense.  There may be 
a sufficiently wide range of endowments across countries so that different countries 
make different products – i.e., countries are in different “cones”. Thus even if the 
developing countries produce in similar sectors among themselves, they will have 
different comparative advantages because patterns of protection might not only reflect 
they are unskilled abundant globally but also they are unskilled abundant regionally. 
A middle income developing country, which is unskilled abundant relative to 
developed countries but skill abundant relative to low income developing countries, 
can have a comparative disadvantage in unskilled labor vis-a vis these low income 
countries and protection of unskilled labor in these middle income developing 
economies is a natural outcome. Thus when the tariffs are abolished the unskilled 
labor see fall in their wages. Leamer (1998) provides supporting evidence by showing 
that world relative labor endowments are much more finely distributed than the 
simple skill-abundant or unskilled-abundant dichotomy: Countries like Mexico may 
very well be globally unskilled abundant yet locally skill abundant, where as countries 
like China may be unskilled abundant both globally and locally. This explains why 
unskilled labor is protected in Mexico. Wood (1999) argues that the entry of countries 
like China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia in the world markets for goods 
with a high content of unskilled labor in the mid- 1980s has an important impact on 
income inequality of middle income countries, particularly those in Latin America. 
His argument is that increased supply of unskilled labor intensive goods changed the 
structure of supply of goods in the world market, reducing their prices and the return 
to factors involved in the production of such goods. This harmed the countries which 
had some comparative advantage in their production. Vos (2003) noted that Latin 
American exports lost their competitiveness in the global markets after trade 
liberalization. As a consequence, these countries are pressured to change their 
production techniques in a search for comparative advantage in the production of 
goods which use semi-skilled labor, resulting in an increase in the demand for this 
type of labor and therefore causing wage dispersion.  
 
The paper tries to find the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality in a cross 
section setting.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the 
data and methodology, section 3 contains the empirical results, and finally section 4 
concludes with some policy implications. 
 
 
Data and Methodology:  
 
We incorporate not 1 but 8 various concepts of openness and trade policy in our 
regression model in order to carry out a robustness check for our results on 
institutions. We have carefully chosen three specific measures of openness. The ratio 
of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is the conventional openness 
indicator (see Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alcala and Ciccone, 2002; Rose, 2002; 
Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Rodrik et al, 2004). Two other measures of openness are 
overall trade penetration (tarshov) derived from World Bank’s TARS system and 
overall import penetration (Impnov) respectively (see Rose, 2002). Neither of these 
measures are direct indicators of trade policy of a country, pointing only towards the 
level of its participation in international trade. There are indicators of trade 
restrictiveness acting as measures of trade policy (Edwards, 1998; Greenaway et al, 
2001, Rose 2002). Import tariffs as percentage of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on 
intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owti), trade taxes as a ratio of overall trade 
(Txtrg) and total import charges (Totimpov) can all be considered as good proxies for 
trade restrictiveness and have also been employed in our study. Other measures which 
capture restrictions in overall trade are non-tariff barriers. We use overall non-tariff 
coverage (Ntarfov) and non-tariff barriers on intermediate inputs and capital goods 
(Owqi) as two proxies for non-tariff barriers (see Rose, 2002). Moreover there is also 
a trend in the trade literature to use composite measures of trade policy. Edwards 
(1998) advocates the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index (Open80) as a proxy 
for openness. 
 
Many recent studies show that institutions and integration are also endogenous (i.e., 
Rodrik et al, 2004) whereas there are issues of two way causality between inequality 
and institutions (i.e., see Keefer and Knack, 2002; Chong and Gradstein, 2004). 
Chong and Gradstein (2004) find strong evidence of bi-directional causality between 
institutions and inequality. Inequality may affect the quality of institutions. For 
example, high inequality will prevent the poor from investing in education or the 
ruling class may not invest in education so that the poor majority will not be 
politically active thus undermining the development of necessary social and political 
institutions. Easterly (2001) and Keefer and Knack (2002) suggests that social 
polarisation negatively affects institutional quality. The countries with poor 
institutions are also likely to have high inequality. For example in Russia in the 1990s, 
a small group of entrepreneurs exploited their political power to promote their own 
interests, subverting the emergence of institutions committed to the protection of 
smaller share holders and businesses. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 
published by Transparency International, among the transition economies, Estonia is 
placed 28, and Hungary 31; whereas Russia is placed 79, and Ukraine 83. In these 
transition economies, weak performance of public institutions, infringement of 
property rights in favour of influential parties, lower willingness to use courts to 
resolve business disputes, lower level of tax compliance and higher levels of bribery 
all have been strongly correlated with inequality (Hellman and Kaufman, 2002). 
Similarly, in several Latin American countries, the ruling elites, the military and large 
businesses impeded smaller business interests giving rise to significant informal 
sector. Chong and Gradstein (2004) have shown that when the political bias in favour 
of the rich is large, income inequality and poor institutional quality may reinforce 
each other, indicating endogeniety between the two.  
 
Figure 1:  Endogeniety between Integration, Institutions and Inequality 
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Any empirical analysis which takes trade as a pure exogenous factor while analysing 
its effects on inequality may lead to miss-specification bias. We construct our 
inequality model in correspondence with the reduced form growth model proposed by 
Rodrik et al (2004) where trade and institutions are taken as endogenous to each other 
as well as the dependent variable which in our case is inequality. See figure 1 for 
illustration. 
 
 
 
Our basic inequality equation would look like: 
 
Inequality = f (Institutions, Integration, Geography) …………......... (1) 
 
Here in line with Rodrik et al (2004), we assume geography is a pure exogenous 
concept. 
 
Much recently Kaufman et al (2002) formulated aggregate governance indicators for 
six dimensions of governance covering 175 countries.  They relied on 194 different 
measures of governance drawn from 17 different sources of subjective governance 
data constructed by 15 different sources including international organizations, 
political and business risk rating agencies, think tanks and non governmental 
organizations. The governance indicators have been oriented so that higher values 
correspond to better outcomes on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. They are categorized as rule 
of law (Rl), political stability (Ps), regulatory quality (Rq), government effectiveness 
(Ge), voice and accountability (Va) and control of corruption (Ctc).  We add two more 
political indicators namely democracy (Demo) and autocracy (Auto) to our analysis 
from Polity dataset whereas, both ranging from 0 to 10.  
 
To capture inequality we not only take GINI income inequality index (Gini) from 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) but also we employ UTIP-
UNIDO Theil measure (Theil) calculated by University of Texas Inequality Project 
(UTIP) which captures wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour. This is 
motivated by several considerations. First, comparable and consistent measures of 
income inequality, whether on a household level or per head basis are difficult, almost 
implausible and generally fails to provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-
country coverage. On the other hand, inequality of manufacturing pay, based on 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more stable, 
more reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO measures are 
based on a two or three digit code of International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) a single systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, manufacturing pay 
has been measured with reasonable accuracy as a matter of official routine in most 
countries around the world for nearly forty years (Galbraith and Kum, 2002).    
 
Corresponding to equation 1, our inequality model based on Theil index has 4 
equations; whereas each equation corresponds to a different institutional or integration 
classification. The model specifications for Gini contain same 2 equations each with 
same variable specifications.  
 
iiii OpenITheil 11111 εχβα +++= ……………2 
iiii TPITheil 55555 εχβα +++= …………….3 
 
The variable iTheil is Theil Index in a country i, iI , iOpen and iTP  are respectively 
measures for institutions, general openness in the economy and trade policy and iε  is 
the random error term.  
 
As we have discussed, there are potential endogenity problems between institutions 
and integration and between institutions and inequality itself. To this effect we have 
first regress our institutional, trade policy and openness proxies on a set of 
instruments. Frankel and Romer (1999) suggests that we can instrument for openness 
by using trade/GDP shares constructed on the basis of a gravity equation for bilateral 
trade flows. The FR approach consists of first regressing bilateral trade flows (as a 
share of country’s GDP) on measures of country mass, distance between the trade 
partners, and a few other geographical variables, and then constructing a predicted 
aggregate trade share for each country on the basis of coefficients estimated. Hall and 
Jones (1999) employed distance from the equator and the extent to which the primary 
languages of Western Europe are spoken as first languages today as instruments for 
institutions.  Hall and Jones made an argument that the instruments are not correlated 
with the error term. Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) identify  the mortality 
of European settlers as a potential instrument. Using two ex post assessments of 
institutional quality- risk of expropriation by the government and constraints on the 
executive- as measures of institutions, they showed that settler mortality is a strong 
predictor of institutions. However there are two drawbacks for AJR instrument. First,  
the data is only available for 64 countries. Though Rodrik et al (2004) have extended 
it to 80 countries; it still covers a relatively low number when compared to ‘the extent 
to which the primary languages of Western Europe are spoken as first languages 
today’ which covers as many as 140 countries. Secondly, according to Glaeser et al 
(2004b), AJR instrument of settler mortality fails to be orthogonal to the error term. 
‘Settler mortality is strongly correlated not just with ancient, but also with the 
modern, decease environment, suggesting that it might be the decease environment, 
rather than history, that matters for economic development. Secondly settler mortality 
is strongly correlated with human capital accumulation, suggesting that it cannot be 
used as an instrument for institutions (Glasear et al, 2004:8).’ Thus following Dollar 
and Kraay (2003) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use ‘fractions of the population 
speaking English (Engfrac) and Western European languages as the first language 
(Eurfrac)’ as an instrument for legal, economic and political institutions. Since we are 
using years of schooling and adult literacy rate as a proxy for social institutions we 
looked for instruments which can capture the qualitative and quantitative properties in 
education sector. Total public spending on education (as a percentage of GDP) and 
primary public-teacher ratio are the two instruments proposed by Mamoon and 
Murshed (2005). The former instrument captures the quality of education and the later 
instrument captures the quantity of education. As in Rodrik et al (2004), we employ 
‘distance from the equator’ as another instrument (proxy for geography) also 
employed by Hall and Jones (1999). 
 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngI 111111 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ ………………..4 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngOpen 444444 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ ……….......5 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngTP 555555 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ ……………....6 
 
 
Where iEng  and iEur are our instruments for legal, economic and political 
institutions referring to fractions of population speaking English and European 
languages respectively. iFR is instrument for openness and trade policy. iDisteq  is 
proxy for geography showing distance from the equator. At the second stage the 
predicted values of respective institutional, openness and trade policy variables are 
employed in the inequality and income share equations.  
 
4. Results:  
 
Table 1 show results of IV augmented regression coefficients for several openness 
and trade policy proxies when the dependent variable is Theil Index. First we would 
like to mention here that on the line of Dollar and Kraay (2004), we have also found 
that there is no systematic relationship between changes in trade volumes and changes 
in household income inequality (Gini).  So here we only discuss the results based on 
Theil Index.  
 
The results for openness indicators confirm that increased globalisation captured by 
an increase in the movement of goods and services leads to augmentation in wage 
inequality. However, the results for trade policy are mixed. The trade policy variables 
which have a significant relationship with wage inequality are overall trade taxes 
(Txtrdg), total import charges (Totimpov) and non tariff coverage (Ntarfov). Totimpov 
and Ntarfov are negatively associated with wage inequality and the relationship is 
significant in 8 out of 10 cases for Totimpov and 3 out of 10 for Ntarfov. The results 
depict that if a country follow a more open policy by decreasing import taxes as well 
as non tariff barriers, it will have a positive effect on wage inequality. In developed 
countries, wage inequality is a phenomenon caused by increase in outsourcing to the 
developing countries. Thus high import taxes may be used as a protection policy to 
provide some kind of breathing space to lower skilled worker who are increasingly 
loosing jobs to developing country labour force. Increase in wage inequality in 
developing countries can be linked to lower import taxes or non tariff barriers by 
suggesting that due to their comparative disadvantage in skilled labor production 
activities domestically, protection against their unskilled intensive agricultural goods 
in developed countries and better export possibilities in skill intensive goods like in 
case of Asian Tigers, China or India, protection of import substitution sector is 
promoted as a pro growth strategy.  Our third significant variable (Txtrdg) has a 
positive relationship with wage inequality and it is significant in 5 out of 8 cases. This 
suggests that any decrease in trade taxes (export taxes specifically6) will lead to a 
decrease in wage inequality. Promoting exports have an egalitarian effect then 
accepting imports. Here the conflicting results among different measures of trade 
policy are due to the fact that decreasing the price for exporting goods may lead to 
their higher demand following economies of scale argument and thus rise in wages of 
the most extensively used labor, whereas protection on imports may make more sense 
considering lack of consensus among developed and developing countries in 
simultaneously decreasing levels of protection in their import substitution sectors. 
Decreasing import taxes may have strong political effects for both developed and 
developing countries if not done simultaneously by both economic groups. That is the 
reason why World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks have yet to reach a consensus. 
However, here one may give a policy recommendation that at least decreasing export 
taxes by any country irrespective of its belonging to any economic group may help to 
wage the gap between skilled and unskilled labor because more exports may mean 
more growth. Decreasing export taxes in a country should also be supplemented by a 
smart export promotion policy to compete in the international markets. However, one 
may take caution on this because generally the least developed countries export 
capacity to developed nations has been curtailed due to high protection in agriculture 
sector. Developing countries are more able to export semi skilled or skilled intensive 
goods as can be seen in Indian and Chinese case. Such export patterns are again 
linked with higher wage inequalities by many country case studies. Here taking 
developed countries out of the sample may also change our results for Txtrdg showing 
decrease in export taxes increasing wage inequality. We find Txtrdg to be positively 
associated with wage inequality when sample is reduced to developing countries only. 
In a scenario where higher exports are positively related with wage inequality in 
developing countries, more South-South trade under regional agreements may lead to 
fairer trade outcomes if least developed countries are able to export agriculture goods 
or primary products to other developing countries who are relatively higher in 
technological ladder and who are following richer consumption patterns. 
 
 
Conclusions: 
 
This paper is an attempt to gauge the effect of integration on inequality. We find that 
openness is generally related with higher wage inequality, though its impact on 
income inequality is insignificant at best. This result is also in line with recent 
literature. Our results highlight the fear among developed and developing countries to 
decrease import taxes which has also lead to the continuous failure of WTO talks as 
the results show that opening up of protected sectors to increased international 
competition by revoking import taxes lead to higher wage inequality in both 
developed and developing countries.  There are two solutions though. Either 
developed countries unilaterally decrease their import taxes on primary products, thus 
allowing even higher export share of developing countries in these products which 
would raise the wages of unskilled labour or alternatively more trade is carried out 
among developing countries which lie in different stages of technological ladder 
through more refined regional trade agreements.  
 
                                                 
1 See for example Aisbett (2003) for detailed commentary about the basis of general perception among 
public that global poverty or inequality is on the rise. 
2 There are three categories of Gini-coefficients. Category 1inequaltiy takes into account per-capita 
incomes of the respective countries. In category 2, the per capita incomes are weighted by population 
size. However category 3 inequality takes into account within country inequalities, which makes it 
superior to the former categories. Sala-i-Martin (2002) employs category 3 measure of inequality. For a 
brief commentary on the three categories of inequality see Murshed (2003). 
3 The paper also estimate other popular indexes of inequality i.e., the variance of log-income, two of 
Atkinsn’s indexes, the mean logarithmic deviation, The Theil Index and the coefficient of variation. All 
indexes show the same decreasing trends in inequality over the selected time period. However, 
Milonovic (2003) argued that Sala-i-Martin made many oversimplifying assumptions and failed to 
address two basic data problems (too few data to derive countries' income distributions, and sparseness 
of such data in time). According to Milanovic, Sala-i-Martin ended up by producing a population-
weighted inter-national distribution of income augmented by a constant shift parameter and not a 
distribution of income among world citizens which has made his results dubious. Additionally in his 
recent paper. 
4 Salai-i-Martin (2002) accepts that despite decreasing trends of Global poverty and inequality levels, 
there is some increase in within-country disparities 
                                                                                                                                            
5
Many studies have criticized the results of Dollar and kraay by raising the apparent weaknesses their 
methodology and variable choice suffered from.. i.e see Ravallion (2003), Amann et al (2002), 
Srinivasam and Bhagwati (2002) 
6 In trade taxes, the effect of export taxes is more dominant (see Mamoon and Murshed 2005) for 
details). 
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Table 1: IV Augmented Regression Coefficients for Openness / Trade Policy  
                                                                                                  Dependent Variable: Theil Index 
Independent 
Variables 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
 ( V a ) ( R l ) ( C t c ) ( R q ) ( G e ) ( P s ) ( D e m o ) ( A u t o ) 
         
Lcopen  0.032 0.036 0.039 0.029 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.035 
 (1.54) (1.68)*** (1.77)*** (1.39) (1.82)*** (1.78)*** (1.70)*** (1.41) 
Impnov85 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (2.66)* (2.87)* (2.88)* (2.48)** (3.01)* (2.86)* (2.57)* (2.28)** 
Impnov82  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (2.68)* (2.91)* (2.92)* (2.63)* (3.06)* (2.93)* (2.67)* (2.41)** 
Tarshov85 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.84)* (3.06)* (3.08)* (2.66)* (3.24)* (3.06)* (2.75)* (2.44)** 
Tarshov82 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.62)* (2.56)* (2.65)* (2.44)** (2.74)* (2.59)* (2.20)** (1.98)** 
Open80s 0.007 -0.033 -0.025 -0.062 0.052 0.030 -0.007 -0.047 
 (0.51) (-0.41) (-0.28) (-0.08) (0.46) (0.28) (-0.09) (-0.84) 
Tariffs -0.004 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
 (-0.34) (0.80) (0.89) (1.11) (0.55) (0.37) (-0.96) (-0.63) 
Owti -0.230 -0.324 -0.302 -0.149 -0.425 -0.366 -0.136 -0.058 
 (-1.34) (-1.53) (-1.50) (-0.86) (-1.78)*** (-1.63) (-0.96) (-0.49) 
Txtrdg 4.810 2.281 2.504 4.509 2.986 2.441 5.713 4.364 
 (1.50) (1.84)*** (1.91)*** (1.63) (1.75)*** (2.03)** (1.46) (1.39) 
Totimpov -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-2.32)** (-1.82)*** (-1.70)*** (-2.31)** (-1.84)*** (-2.04)** (-2.56)* (-2.33)** 
Owqi -0.800 -1.082 -1.243 -0.522 -1.101 -1.010 -0.487 -0.264 
 (-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.85) (-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.94) (-1.01) (-0.94) 
Ntarfov -0.002 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.64) (-0.82) (-0.26) (-1.66)*** (-1.04) (-1.30) (-2.09)** (-2.12)** 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in paranthesis. 
  DATA AND SOURCES: 
 
Altr: Adult Literacy Rate, Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002) 
 
Auto: Autocracy, Year: 1999, Source: Polity IV dataset  
 
Ctc: Control for Corruption, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Demo: Democracy, (numeric) Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high), Democracy Score: general 
openness of political institutions. The 11-point Democracy scale is constructed additively. 
Year: 1999, Source: Polity IV dataset 
 
Disteq: Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90. Source: Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
 
Engfrac: Fraction of the population speaking English. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & 
Trebbi (2002) 
 
Eurfrac: Fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe: 
English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi 
(2002) 
 
Ge: Government Effectiveness,  Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Gini: Coefficient in Percentage Points as calculated by WIDER. Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
 
High10:  Highest Income Decile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
High20: Fifth Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm  
 
Sch:  Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1999. Source: Barro R & J. W. Lee 
data set, http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
 
Impnov85: Import Penetration: overall, 1985.  Source: Rose (2002). 
 
Impnov82: Import Penetration: overall, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
 
Lcopen: Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nomnal) imports plus 
exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 6. 
 
Logfrankrom (FR) : Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following Frankel and 
Romer (1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables. Source: Frankel and 
Romer (1999). 
 
Nontarfov: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: Overall, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
 
Open80s: Sachs and Warners (1995) composite openness index. Source: Rose (2002). 
 
Owqi: Non Trade Barriers Frequency on intermediate inputs, Capital goods, 1985. Source: Rose 
(2002). 
 
Owti:  Tariffs on Intermediate and Capital Goods, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
 
Ps: Political Stability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Rl: Rule of Law, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Rq : Regulatory Quality, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
 
Tarshov85:  TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
 
Tarshov82: TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1982. Source:  Rose (2002). 
 
Tariffs: Import Duties as %age imports, Year:1985. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 
2002. 
 
Theil: UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure - calculated based on UNIDO2001 by UTIP, 
Year: 1997. Source: University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) http://utip.gov.utexas.edu. 
 
Totimpov:  Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
 
Txtrg: Trade taxes / trade, 1982. Source: rose (2002) 
 
Va: Voice and Accountability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
